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Abstract –Knowing the strategy of an opponent in a competitive environment conveys obvious
evolutionary advantages. But this information is costly, and the benefit of being informed may not
necessarily offset the additional cost. Here we introduce social dilemmas with informed strategies,
and we show that this gives rise to two cyclically dominant triplets that form defensive alliances.
The stability of these two alliances is determined by the rotation velocity of the strategies within
each triplet. A weaker strategy in a faster rotating triplet can thus overcome an individually
stronger competitor. Fascinating spatial patterns favor the dominance of a single defensive al-
liance, but enable also the stable coexistence of both defensive alliances in very narrow regions of
the parameter space. A continuous reentrant phase transition reveals before unseen complexity
behind the stability of strategic alliances in evolutionary social dilemmas.
Successful evolution of cooperation in the realm of so-
cial dilemmas is a grand challenge that continues to at-
tract research across the social and natural sciences [1–6].
When individuals are torn between what is best for them
and what is best for their society, cooperation can quickly
come to play second fiddle to the pursuit of short-term
personal benefits. Although studies in evolutionary game
theory [7–11] have revealed fundamental rules that pro-
mote cooperation [12], the chasm behind the Darwinian
“only the fittest survive” and the abundance of coopera-
tion in human and animal societies remains overwhelming.
The availability of information has been the holy grail in
modern game theory since its inception [13]. If one knew
the rules of the game and what strategy the opponent will
play, then the best response would be guaranteed [14–16].
In repeated evolutionary settings with many players and
under the reasonable assumption that information about
the opponents is not free, however, the prospects are much
less clear. In fact, recent human experiments have revealed
that, contrary to expectations, costly information about
the neighbors can impair the evolution of cooperation in
social dilemmas [17]. Important unanswered questions are
thus: (i) Under which conditions are informed strategies
— players that invest into learning the strategies of other
players — evolutionary stable? (ii) What are the proper-
ties of these stable solutions? and (iii) Which mechanisms
are responsible for their stability?
In this letter, we answer these questions by introducing
social dilemmas with informed strategies. The following
matrix describes the payoffs of the four competing
strategies:
C D IC ID
C R S R S
D T P 0 P
IC R− ǫ 0− ǫ R− ǫ 0− ǫ
ID T − ǫ 0− ǫ 0− ǫ 0− ǫ
Between unconditional cooperators (C) and defectors (D),
in agreement with the traditional formulation of a social
dilemma [18], mutual cooperation yields the reward R,
p-1
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Fig. 1: The direction of invasion between the competing strate-
gies (see arrows), where the two cyclically dominant triplets
IC → D → C → IC and IC → ID → C → IC form a defensive
alliance against the external strategy (either ID or D).
mutual defection leads to punishment P , and the mixed
choice gives the cooperator the sucker’s payoff S and the
defector the temptation T . Informed cooperators (IC) and
defectors (ID), on the other hand, invest ǫ into knowing
the strategy of their opponent and act accordingly. In
particular, IC players refuse to be exploited by defectors,
while ID players avoid being punished when encountering
other defectors. We suppose that being informed conveys
an advantage to ID players compared to D players. With-
out increasing the number of parameters further, the sim-
plest way to ensure this is that Ds are still being punished
if they meet with an ID player. For simplicity but with-
out loss of generality, we may decrease the number of free
parameters by introducing T = 1 + r, R = 1, P = −p
and S = −r. Furthermore, the condition 0 < p < r,
namely that the punishment for mutual defection is less
than the sucker’s payoff and that the reward for mutual co-
operation is smaller than the temptation to defect, yields
T > R > P > S and thus returns the most demanding and
widely studied social dilemma — the prisoner’s dilemma
game (cf. [19–32]).
With this definition of the payoffs, the directions of in-
vasion between the competing strategies are as shown in
Fig. 1. An unconditional cooperator (C) will always beat
an informed cooperator (IC), simply because the latter
has to bear the cost ǫ. True to the formulation of a tradi-
tional social dilemma, an unconditional defector (D) will
also beat C. This relation is reversed against IC players
due to their ability to avoid exploitation, as long as ǫ < p.
The IC strategy is also superior to informed defectors (ID)
because although both have to bear ǫ, IC players do bene-
fit from mutual cooperation. Moreover, if we assume ǫ < p
and thus also ǫ < r (because r > p), ID beats both D and
C, respectively.
The relations between the strategies shown in Fig. 1 re-
veal the competition between two strategy triplets, namely
IC → D → C → IC and IC → ID → C → IC . These two
triplets form a so-called defensive alliance [33–35] that pro-
tects them against the external fourth strategy that is not
within the loop. For example, the (IC + ID + C) triplet
is able to prevent strategy D from invading because both
IC and ID beat D. Similarly, the (IC +D + C) prevents
the invasion of ID. Despite of these relatively simple and
clear-cut relations, several open questions remain, such as
which informed strategy is able to prevail and how high
can the cost ǫ be, which defensive alliance is stable, or can
the two triplets coexist?
Since pattern formation always plays a decisive role in
structured populations [36], we proceed with an in-depth
analysis of the proposed evolutionary game on a L × L
square lattice with periodic boundary conditions. Unless
stated differently, we use random initial conditions such
that all four strategies are uniformly distributed across
the lattice. We simulate the evolutionary process in ac-
cordance with the standard Monte Carlo simulation pro-
cedure comprising the following elementary steps. First,
a randomly selected player x acquires its payoff Πx by
playing the game with all its four neighbors. Next, player
x randomly chooses one neighbor y, who then also ac-
quires its payoff Πy in the same way as previously player
x. Lastly, player x adopts the strategy sy from player
y with a probability determined by the Fermi function
W (sy → sx) = (1 + exp[(Πx −Πy)/K])
−1
, whereK = 0.1
quantifies the uncertainty related to the strategy adop-
tion process [1]. The selected value ensures that better-
performing players are readily followed by their neigh-
bors, although adopting the strategy of a player that per-
forms worse is not impossible either. Note that the results
remain qualitatively similar in a wide range within the
K < 2 interval. At very high K values, however, the
system arrives to the random imitation limit. Each full
Monte Carlo step (MCS) gives a chance for every player to
change its strategy once on average. During simulations,
we have used lattices with up to 4000 × 4000 players to
avoid undesired finite-size effects, and we have determined
the stationary fractions of the strategies in the stationary
state after sufficiently long relaxation times extending up
to 4 · 105 MCS. In addition, we have repeated every run
up to 100 times with different initial conditions to further
decrease statistical fluctuations.
In Fig. 2, we show the complete r − p phase diagram
of the system as obtained for a representative value of ǫ.
We would like to stress, however, that qualitatively similar
behavior can be obtained for all relevant values of param-
eters ǫ or K. Several interesting solutions deserve to be
highlighted. First, the IC strategy is always viable, even
though in its absence defectors would easily eradicate un-
conditional cooperators. However, the later also become
viable as second-order free-riders of IC (first-order free-
riders are either D or ID players). For low values of p
the (IC +D + C) triplet prevails and ID players die out,
while for high values of p the (IC + ID + C) triplet wins
on the expense of D. Interestingly, there is a very nar-
row dividing stripe where both triplets coexist, and where
thus all four strategies survive. The dependence on r is
even more interesting. At an intermediate value of p, the
system undergoes a succession of four consecutive phase
transitions as r increases, after which it ends in the same
p-2
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Fig. 2: Full r − p phase diagram, as obtained for ǫ = 0.3.
Solid red line denotes continuous phase transitions from the
very narrow but stable IC + D + C + ID phase to the stable
IC +D+C phase, while the dotted blue line denotes reentrant
continuous phase transitions to the stable IC + ID +C phase.
Dashed green line is the p < r border.
IC+ID+C phase in which it started. This reentrant phase
transition is illustrated in the top panel of Fig. 3, where
both IC+ID+C phases are separated by two very narrow
IC +D+C + ID stripes and a broader IC +D+C region
in the middle. What is truly remarkable is that the com-
petition between D and ID (which exchange in the two
triplets) is not directly affected by the value of r. What
is more, four out of all the six relations in the food web
are independent of r. While a reentrant phase transition
has been reported before in the realm of predator-prey
interactions due to rewiring [37], here it is due solely to
strategic interactions.
An explanation for the unexpected behavior thus has to
lie in the D → C and ID → C invasion rates, which are
directly affected by r. The bottom panel of Fig. 3 reveals
a monotonous dependence of the two invasion rates on r,
whereby both curves start and terminate at an identical
level. Thus, at both ends the two triplets have an equally
fast internal dynamics, but since ID players beat D play-
ers, the dominance belongs to the (IC + ID + C) triplet.
But for intermediate values of r, the D → C invasion is
significantly more efficient than the ID → C invasion, and
the average rotation of strategies within the (IC +D+C)
triplet is therefore much faster than in the (IC + ID +C)
triplet. Due to this difference in the internal dynamics, the
ID players meet with their direct predator, the IC players
(see the food web in Fig. 1), more frequently. Because of
this the faster rotating alliance is able to overcome the di-
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Fig. 3: Top panel shows a characteristic cross-section of the
phase diagram in Fig. 2, as obtained for p = 0.45. Depicted
are stationary fractions of the four competing strategies in de-
pendence on r. After a succession of four continuous phase
transitions, the system ends up in the same IC + ID +C phase
in which it started. The reentrant phase transition on both
sides is preceded by a very narrow region (marked by arrows)
where all four strategies coexist. Bottom panel shows the inva-
sion rates between cooperator and defector strategies (see leg-
end) in dependence on r, as obtained for ǫ = 0.3 and p = 0.45.
The hysteresis is crucial for the understanding of the reentrant
phase transition to the IC + ID + C phase (see main text for
details).
rect evolutionary disadvantage thatD players have against
ID players, and in fact reverse the outcome of the compe-
tition between the two defensive alliances in favor of the
(IC +D + C) triplet. Naturally, as soon as the two inva-
sion rates meet at either the low or the high limit of r, the
difference in the rotation speeds within the alliances dis-
appears, and the original victor, the (IC + ID+C) triplet,
is restored.
As we have shown, when the D → C and ID → C
invasion rates are equal, the winner is decided by virtue
of the direct dominance of ID players over D players and
thus the (IC + ID + C) triplet wins. On the other hand,
when the D → C invasion is significantly more efficient,
then the faster average rotation of strategies within the
p-3
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Fig. 4: Consecutive snapshots of the square lattice, as obtained for r = 0.65 (top row) and r = 0.95 (bottom row) from a
prepared initial state. During the relaxation period, each half of the lattice contained the strategies of one triplet only. After
the characteristic patterns evolved (leftmost panels), the separating wall (vertical white line) was removed and the two defensive
alliances could then start to compete with each other. In the top row, the (IC + D + C) triplet, which is depicted by dark
blue, light blue, and light red colors (overall lighter), gradually compresses the (IC + ID +C) triplet, which is depicted by dark
blue, light blue, and dark red colors (overall darker). For convenience, the typical size of the shrinking alliance is encircled
with a white ellipse. The snapshots were taken at t = 0, 100, 200 and 500 MCS from left to right. In the bottom row, the
(IC + ID + C) triplet gradually rises to dominance because ID players are superior to D players. Accordingly, the domains of
the (IC +D+C) triplet (encircled with white ellipses for clarity) disappear over time. Here the snapshots were taken at t = 0,
100, 1000 and 4500 MCS. Note that the evolutionary process in this case is almost ten times slower than in the top row. Other
parameter values used in both cases are L = 200, p = 0.4 and ǫ = 0.3.
(IC + D + C) triplet proves fatal for the (IC + ID + C)
triplet. These two different mechanisms that decide the
competition between the two defensive alliances can also
be appreciated through patterns that form on the square
lattice, as illustrated in Fig. 4. For clarity, we have split
the square lattice in half and used prepared initial states
to highlight the competition between the two triplets.
The top row of Fig. 4 depicts the evolution when the
(IC +D + C) is the more dynamic triplet. It can be ob-
served that the other triplet gradually decreases in size
because its defensive capacity is compromised. To illus-
trate this monotonous decay, we have marked the typical
size of the shrinking area by white ellipses during the in-
termediate stages of the evolutionary process. Although
we only present a few snapshots, the difference in the ro-
tation velocity within the two defensive alliances is still
remarkably obvious. While the large majority of the typ-
ical pattern that characterizes the (IC + ID + C) triplet
(right side of the lattice) remains practically unchanged,
the (IC + D + C) triplet (left side of the lattice) com-
pletes a whole strategy rotation during this time. Note
that in the leftmost panel the majority of players within
the (IC + D + C) alliance is in the cooperator state, in
the second panel D players abound, and then in the third
panel the original fraction of C + IC players is again re-
stored. Actually, such an “oscillation” is just a finite-size
effect that is very useful for illustrative purposes, while in
fact the fractions of the strategies are time-independent
in the stationary state if a sufficiently large system size is
used.
Conversely, the bottom row of Fig. 4 depicts the evo-
lution when the strategies within the two triplets rotate
equally fast. Accordingly, the pattern formation is sig-
nificantly different from the one shown in the top row
of Fig. 4. Here the roles of strategies ID and D in the
two alliances are interchangeable — both strategies beat
strategy C with practically the same efficiency. As a con-
sequence, the patterns formed by the two triplets are very
similar, and this not just approximately but quantitatively
as well. If we compare the fractions of D and ID players
in the stable IC +D+C and IC + ID +C phases around
the right reentrant phase transition depicted in the top
p-4
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Fig. 5: Top panel shows the fraction of strategy D in the IC +
D+C phase at p = 0.33 and the fraction of the ID strategy in
the IC+ID+C phase at p = 0.6 in dependence on r, as obtained
for ǫ = 0.3. The bottom panel shows the corresponding fraction
of IC players (ρIC ) in the two triplets at the same two values
of p (see legend). Counterintuitively, due to cyclic dominance,
as the temptation to defect increases, the fraction of defectors
goes down while the fraction of informed cooperators goes up.
panel of Fig. 3, we can observe that they are practically
equivalent (just switch values). Indeed, the superiority
of the ID strategy manifests only when it is faced with
strategy D. Because of this “individual” competition, the
evolutionary process is much slower than in the top row
(note that it takes ten times longer to reach the single-
triple stationary state). Another more subtle consequence
of identically fast average rotations of strategies within the
two competing triplets is that there is a good chance for
a lucky D player to emerge and spread efficiently on the
expense of C players. In doing so, regions of the square
lattice that already belonged to the (IC + ID +C) triplet
may be temporarily lost to the (IC +D + C) triplet. We
have marked such unexpected patches of the (IC +D+C)
alliance by white ellipses in the third panel of the bottom
row of Fig. 4.
An unexpected but important consequence of cyclic
dominance in the studied system is also the peculiar de-
pendence of the fractions of individual strategies within
the two defensive alliances on r, which we illustrate in
Fig. 5. Based on the payoff matrix, we would expect
that increasing values of r will unambiguously support
both defector strategies and at the same time weaken un-
conditional cooperators, as is the case in the traditional
two-strategy prisoner’s dilemma game. But as results pre-
sented in Fig. 5 show, exactly the opposite happens regard-
less of which defensive alliance is dominant. This coun-
terintuitive behavior is a beautiful consequence of cyclic
dominance, where the direct support for a particular strat-
egy will actually promote its “superior” in the food web.
Such evolutionary outcomes are common in rock-paper-
scissors-like systems, where feeding a prey often promotes
the predator [38–45]. In the studied social dilemma with
informed strategies this is exactly what happens, since in-
creasing the value of r will directly support D and ID
strategies, which however are both prey to the IC strat-
egy (see the food web in Fig. 1). As demonstrated in the
bottom panel of Fig. 5, indeed the fraction of IC goes up
in both phases as r increases. An additional consequence
of increasing the value of r is that it lowers the fitness of C
players. Since the latter act as second-order free-riders of
IC players, and are at the same time prey to both D and
ID strategies, this also promotes the viability of informed
cooperators.
Before summarizing our findings, we briefly discuss the
role of the information cost ǫ. Throughout this work, we
have considered ǫ = 0.3, as it yields the most representa-
tive system dynamics. By increasing the value of ǫ, the
informed strategies become weaker. While the ID → D re-
lation still holds, the intensity of this invasion decreases.
Consequently, the winning mechanism of the (IC+ID+C)
triplet is negatively affected, and the region where the
faster rotating (IC +D+C) triplet is able to compensate
the ID → D relation expands. For ǫ > 0.64 the IC+ID+C
alliance disappears completely. On the other hand, lower ǫ
values intensify the ID → D invasion, and accordingly, the
region where the IC + ID +C triplet is dominant expands
on the expense of the IC+D+C triplet. Nevertheless, the
faster rotating IC +D+C alliance can defend its stability
throughout the small ǫ region.
In summary, we have proposed and studied an evolu-
tionary social dilemma game with informed strategies. We
have identified elementary relations between the four com-
peting strategies in the governing food web, which revealed
the existence of two three-strategy defensive alliances. By
means of systematic Monte Carlo simulations, we have re-
vealed key determinants of stability of the two competing
triplets, and we have observed fascinating solutions that
are driven by pattern formation and cyclic dominance.
We have shown that a direct evolutionary advantage of
a strategy within a defensive alliance can be compensated
by the other alliance through a faster internal rotation of
its strategies. Thus, even though in the food web the in-
formed defectors are superior to unconditional defectors,
the alliance whose defense relies on the weaker strategy
can still prevail. In particular, we have shown that the
p-5
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competition between a direct food-web-based evolutionary
advantage and an evolutionary advantage that is rooted in
the spatiotemporal dynamics of a defensive alliance gives
rise to a reentrant phase transition. In-between the two
stable three-strategy phases that form the reentrant pair,
we have also identified a very narrow region of coexis-
tence of both defensive alliances, which emerges as a con-
sequence of a delicate equilibrium of the two competing
mechanisms.
When approaching more realistic conditions to study
the evolution of cooperation [46, 47], the emergence of
cyclic dominance becomes more and more likely. Our re-
search highlights that the final outcome in such cases de-
pends sensitively not just on the individual relations be-
tween the competitors as determined by payoff elements,
but in an equally strong manner also on the dynamical
properties of alliances. This in turn makes interventions
aimed as steering such complex systems risky and to a
large degree unpredictable.
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